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・ The Chinese government has begun to call for 
a “high-quality Belt and Road Initiative”. 
 
・ At the same time, more multifaceted issues and 
softer approaches have become apparent. 
 
・ It is hoped that the Chinese government will be 
more pro-active in releasing relevant data. 
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The Belt and Road Initiative has now been underway for six years, and 
transformations are being considered in three regards: (1) a greater emphasis 
on sustainability and quality, (2) a more multifaceted scope, and (3) an increased 
focus on soft elements. 
The first direction for transformation in the Belt and Road Initiative is a 
greater emphasis on sustainability and quality, topics that China itself has plainly 
begun to mention. For example, the keyword “high quality” did not appear even 
once in Xi Jinping’s keynote address at the first Belt and Road Forum for 
International Cooperation held in May 2017, but it was brought up six times in his 
April 2019 keynote address. In April 2019, China’s Ministry of Finance 
announced the “Debt Sustainability Framework for Participating Countries of the 
Belt and Road Initiative”. 
The second direction for transformation in the Belt and Road Initiative is 
a more multifaceted scope. This has manifested itself in the more widespread 
use of certain relevant references, among them being the laying of optic cables, 
the sharing of satellite information, a “Digital Belt and Road” inclusive of data 
distribution, a “Silk Road on Ice” linked to China’s foreign policy on the Arctic, 
and the “Action Plan for Harmonization of Standards Along the Belt and Road 
(2018–2020)” that seeks to formulate international standards for 13 industrial 
sectors. 
The third change is the emphasis on softer elements. The emphasis at 
the Conference on Dialogue of Asian Civilizations held in Beijing in May 2019 
was not on infrastructure and economic cooperation but rather on softer 
international cooperation in the forms of think-tank exchanges and cultural 
contacts. 
These three transformations are occurring because the Chinese 
government is confronting economic, political and international circumstances 
vastly different from those of 2012 when the Belt and Road Initiative was 
conceived. Perhaps the most conspicuous environmental change has been 
US-China trade frictions. Accusations that the Belt and Road Initiative creates 
debt traps have clearly led to China’s emphasis on a “high-quality Belt and Road 
Initiative”. Chinese officials began in 2018 emphasizing a “high-quality Belt and 
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Road Initiative”, which suddenly became a keyword at the second Belt and Road 
Forum for International Cooperation in 2019. On the one hand, a more 
transparent project management structure could limit the potential for funding 
that China has been freely providing. On the other, such a structure is seen as 
necessary for China itself from the perspective of managing funds. Connectivity 
improvements via infrastructure that were the initial priority of the Belt and Road 
Initiative continue to occupy an essential place but here, too, the preconditions 
have changed. In 2012, just prior to the announcement of the Belt and Road 
Initiative, much attention was being focused in China on the “two surpluses” of 
foreign reserves and steel production. In 2019, however, China is now under 
pressure from capital outflows, and the overcapacity in steel production 
continues to subside. 
 
Source: Compiled from People’s Daily database 
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Are Japanese companies and the Japanese government able to cope 
with these transformations in the Belt and Road Initiative? Conditional 
cooperation through third-market cooperation with Chinese companies is being 
pursued through projects within the Belt and Road Initiative that are relatively 
transparent and sustainable. Enjoying comparative advantages that differ from 
those of their Chinese counterparts, Japanese companies see potential for joint 
market development in third countries. In addition to Japanese and Chinese 
firms jointly engaged in plant construction projects already begun, financial and 
content companies are included among those participating in the 52 projects that 
have been announced. Attention will be focused on the results forthcoming in 
these new sectors. More important for Japanese companies than gaining 
practical benefits from cooperation abroad will be the more stable business 
environment for Japanese companies operating in China that firmer 
Japan-China relations will bring. 
At the same time, the Japanese government is promoting several 
multilateral frameworks – the TPP11, the Japan-EU EPA, and the Free and 
Open Indo-Pacific Initiative – and it is actively helping create rules for 
e-commerce at the WTO. In a broad sense, these could be said to be efforts that 
address the increasingly multifaceted nature of the Belt and Road Initiative. 
Should the Belt and Road Initiative successfully complete the 
aforementioned transformations, a high-quality, comprehensive and softer Belt 
and Road Initiative will emerge. The actual changes will likely not be as simplistic 
as described here. Even so, the fact that the world’s second largest economic 
power is making adjustments to its flagship initiative is quite obvious, and a close 
eye should be kept on developments. 
Only limited data is currently available on China’s investment and aid, 
hindering understanding of the Belt and Road Initiative. There are quite a few 
private-sector companies in China seeking straight commercial ventures 
overseas. As the relevant data becomes more transparent, it will become 
possible to discuss the quality of the Initiative more frankly. Even if it may be 
difficult for China to accede to the OECD DAC, the Chinese government needs 
to be more pro-active in disclosing data on aid and investment connected with 
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the Belt and Road Initiative to enable fair and transparent discussions and 
assessments.  
 
Asei Ito is Associate Professor at The University of Tokyo.. 
